The following manuscript is a draft. It is currently being revised, and when revised will be published by Prentice-Hall.
The numbered chapters are all being extensively revised and no part of it, as written, stands as final now. Revisions on all parts Aspects of Aspects | 3 of it have been proceeding and it should be completed for publication by 1971.
The manuscript is in two parts. This is part one.
The absence of Chapter 1 is explained as follows:
As of September, 1970, Chapter One has been so extensively revised that the current multi-copy version is omitted. The focus of this chapter is "Second Stories", and some work on that may be seen in the Spring and Summer lectures from 1970. i The three extant chapters are on roughly the following topics: §2.
The speaker-sequential organisation of conversation. This is effectively a draft systematics for turn-taking, accounting as it does for "one at a time" and "speaker change recurs" in conversations with more than two parties. Some topics include:
greetings and their absence ("He didn't even say hello"); interruptions and ensuing complaints about them; what constitutes a "violation". §3. Hearers' problems. Here, Sacks addresses such matters as analysing others' talk for the possibility of conjoint productions; for example conjoint completions.
The chapter deals with the general notion of completion points and, in particular, with hearers' attention to "possible completions". The units monitored or analysed by hearers are referred to as "sentence units". Some topics include: introductions and orienting newcomers to an ongoing conversation; reference to persons as forms of "categorical incumbency"; everyday actions as methodical "solutions" to routine problems; "ultra-rich" topics (teenagers talking about cars); features of joint productions. §4. Questions of gap and overlap. Sacks notes that gaps and overlaps are locatable in materials but (more importantly) they can be analysed as artefacts of an orientation by speakers and hearers to their orderly avoidance or minimisation. Particularly important in this respect are completion markerssuch things as: post-completors ("Didn't you hear me?"); utterance completors (tag questions: "isn't it?"); utterance incompletors (sentence connectors: "but", Aspects of Aspects | 4
"and", "however"); and stoppers ("Wait a minute!"). The chapter also includes considerations of topic and topicality in relation to completors ("I still say though...") and "on topic" topic markers ("I just had a thought"). ii Following this, Sacks returns to the draft "systematics" of Chapter 2 in terms of "talking beyond a single possible sentence".
Speaker sequencing
Here I'm interested in the extended use which Sacks makes of an approach to conversational sequencing via concepts such as "sentence", "clause" and "utterance". Here is an interesting example of Sacks's use of the notion of a sentence from page 19 of Chapter 2:
The sentence unit is a general structuring device for utterances. For a speaker sequencing system operating in an utterance by utterance fashion and where "utterance completion" occasions the operation of the speaker change technique employed in a current utterance ... a general problem that a speaker faces is how it is that such matters as "incompletion" the "upcomingness of completion" the "accomplishing of completion" are to be shown such that hearers who have found which type of selection technique has been employed can determine when that type of technique is to be employed where the timing of their use is a non-incidental feature of their use. It happens that the sentence as a unit can have, given the way that it can be attended by participants, its completion recognized on its completion, that it is not complete recognized by participants, and also; it can be monitored from its beginning to see
from its beginning what it will take for its completion to be Aspects of Aspects | 5 produced in such a way that on its completion its completion may be recognized.
This opens up an initial suspicion about the terminology (to be explicited shortly):
namely that we are dealing here with an earlier elaboration of such now-standard matters as conversational turns, turn-constructional units (TCUs) and transitionrelevance places (TRPs), but using a more traditional vocabulary for those phenomena. It also shows that something such as projecting completion (of, be it noted, specific kinds of technique for turn transition) was critical for Sacks's early solution to the "multi-party problem". Sacks adverts to this problem throughout the published lectures (see especially 1992a, pp. 624-632). It runs something like the following: in a conversation with two parties, the sequencing of turns will be given by an intuitively obvious rule: if one party talks at a time, the sequence will be expectably A,B,A,B, etc. What then could be an equivalent rule (or, as it turned out, rules) for more than two parties? The "Simplest Systematics" paper (Sacks et al., 1974) turned out to offer the famously definitive solution to this question, proposing general rules for the relations between speakers, turns, turn-technique types, TCUs and TRPs such that not only (a) completions could be heard in advance by next speakers but also (b) projected turn-transition types could be heard in advance of such completions, so that (c) any next speaker could tell in advance both when to speak and also what kind of utterance to construct in next turn. To be sure, the 1970 terminology based on "sentences" (and the rest) by no means achieves this; but it does show that it is exactly this question that is on the agenda and that the double onus on speakers to project both transition types and their completion points is critical to the matter in hand.
While formal-linguistic terminology ("sentence", "clause", etc.) Introduction to the first volume of the Lectures, especially p. xlvii). However, the adversion to "sentence", "clause" and the rest may not be so curious given that these terms can be fairly consistently translated into the vocabulary that was to emerge later in the "Simplest Systematics" .
That is, it's possible to read Sacks's use of the word "sentence" as (roughly) equivalent to "turn constructional unit" (TCU) -"roughly" because "clause" sometimes carries this work. We can also read his use of "utterance" as equivalent to "turn". Then "possible completion (point)" becomes equivalent to "transition relevance place" (TRP In this context, for me, the important but passing noticing is "Not having used a possible sentence completion, he may use a next". So, even if not listed precisely as a type of turn construction, "current continues" is a definite consideration; perhaps as that completion which is not one.
Put shortly, Aspects may not constitute a simplest systematics but it is a systematics -that is a possible (draft, projected) solution to the "multi-party
problem" -for all that. And if attention to local detail is as important as parsimony (which it may or may not be), there may not be every virtue in a
Aspects of Aspects | 8 systematics being the simplest possible. In any case, it is intriguing to follow Sacks through this earlier and original solution to the multi-party problem.
On the problem of clauses and sentences (and critical, then, for how we And while CA still debates its own putatively scientific status (cf. Anderson and Sharrock, 1984; Bogen, 1999; Coulter, 1983; Lynch, 1993a; Lynch, 1993b; Lynch and Bogen, 1994) , it seems reasonably clear to me that Aspects, as Sacks's draft, I suspect, does not achieve this end. But, more than any other of his extant writings, it makes that intention clear as day. We can only imagine what it would have looked like if completed to his satisfaction.
Repair and correction
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How was Sacks considering matters of repair and correction at this time? Section 5 of Chapter 2 of Aspects reworks material from Lecture 4 in Part I of the second volume of the Lectures (Fall 1968; see Sacks, 1992b, pp. 44-55) . This section of the book is on complaints, and on the general sequencing structures that complaints are an instance of. This strongly prefigures the notion of "initiation of correction"
and its sequential placement as per the "Preference for Self-correction" paper (Schegloff et al., 1977) . That is, the particular sequence "Interruption -> Complaint -> Apology" can be read as a specific instance of the more general In some ways, this is typical of the hints that Aspects offers. We are never quite told what the "many other things" happen to be and are left to speculate (in this case, in the light of a later, more developed analysis). A "complaint" may be preceded by an "interruption" and followed by an "apology". One party "interrupts", the next "complains" (about the interruption) and then the original party "apologises" for it. Again we should refer to Sacks himself for the basic "flavour" of this sort of sequence (Chapter 2, page 40):
Complaining starts a sequence. Just as it is the case for complaints that they do not need to locate what it is that they are complaining about, i.e., they do not need to say what to look to to find whether a complainable occurred, so the same goes for the various things that can follow a complaint. That is to say, if one offers an apology like "I'm sorry", or an excuse, or a denial, then those are heard as Pages 31-33 of this chapter, that is, contain an interesting variation on the idea of correction by comparison with the "Preference for Self-correction" paper.
Here, Sacks announces that (what he is calling) corrections do not have to have a "trouble source" as such, something that is "wrong". Such a view he calls "backwards looking". Instead, he argues for a kind of correction that is "forward looking". As we have noted, the version in the "Preference" paper works with the triad: TROUBLE-SOURCE -> INITIATION -> CORRECTION. In Sacks's earlier version, the first component need not be present; it can be null. Hence the data fragment, below, does not constitute a "repair" in the sense intended in the "Preference"
paper. What Sacks is commenting on, instead, is how a "self-correction", in this instance, can re-shape the turn it falls in so that the speaker can proceed to Aspects of Aspects | 11 produce a multi-clause sentence. Let us look at Sacks's argument in more detail.
The data fragment in question runs as follows:
( [T]he new, the second sentence does not stand to the first as some corrections do; i.e., as simply a replacement sentence, but it is in some ways a quite genuine second sentence in the sense that it
quite differs from what the first has already successfully asserted.
That is, it does not correct the first's available assertion about having been in Northern California, but adds that, at the time that was in the course of being mentioned when the correction is done Finally, let us note, fourth, that there is nothing wrong with the sentence that gets corrected, and that the way it is proceeding can readily involve its being brought to a natural grammatical conclusion, i.e., ". . . about three weeks ago . . ." period.
In short, what gives the correction its quality as a correction -or, we might say, how it comes to have the meaning of being a correction -is not so much a matter of its content. In this case, it is not that it has content which replaces the originally projected utterance by virtue of some trouble that can be heard with that original utterance. In fact, there is no "trouble" as such and no replacement; instead there is an amplification or "specification". Consequently, the utterance's status as a correction is given purely by its sequential placement. shall again find that the answer we have specifically built to deal with this piece of data, while it may have some sort of intuitive appeal to it, will not have that sort of intuitive appeal which involves our recognition that the explanation is one that
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we are at home with -that we know that that is a reason why people do things, so it may be the reason here.
This repeats the methodological point made over and again by Sacks: the analysis of the machinery for the production of some event must be just as plausible as the event itself, though it may be counter-intuitive (in the sense of things "that we are at home with") -even if, at the end of the day, "it may have some sort of intuitive appeal", as it were, of its own. The machinery, that is, will indeed generate how "we know that that is a reason why people do things", but only as a by-product.
So this -"that we [commonsensically] know that that is a reason why people do things" -is not a suitably "scientific" account. answer: we do corrections in order to replace something that has gone wrong in a prior utterance or utterance part. A single instance of (or "venue" for) a correction being done in some other way shows us that a more general aspect of social ordering is operating -and provably so in the sense of being answerable to specific materials -but one which turns out to be quite contrary to our intuition about such things. A similar case in point is Sacks's observations on the relations between topical and sequential organisation in ordinary talk. I will turn briefly to this matter before returning to the question of what sort of thing a conversational "machinery" might look like. The point is -and this is further evidence of Sacks's analytic "holism" -that matters of topic can't easily be dealt with separately from matters of sequentiality.
Topical-, referential-and sequential-organisation
Topic is not, as we might imagine or intuit, a question of mere "content" so much as of sequential organisation itself. Again, we see the analytic and methodological consequences of (again, roughly) a kind of Wittgensteinian approach to meaning.
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Intuitively, we might consider conversational meaning to be a function of the kinds of reference its topics are able to achieve; and sequencing to be a merely secondary matter to that; as a linear series of "slots" into which semanticallyloaded "fillers" can be inserted. Sacks wants to show otherwise: that how talk gets done as a form of sequential ordering is the key to what people "mean" when they talk.
In Chapter 3 (page 50), Sacks also makes it clear that he does not necessarily separate out sequencing analysis from "reference analysis" -as in "reference to persons", hence what later came to be called "membership categorisation analysis". He is discussing the Group Therapy Session fragment that involves some insults and return insults ("Ken, face it, you're a poor little rich kid"; "Yes
Mommy"). The analysis turns on Roger referring to Ken via the category "Mommy". On any referentialist account, the selection of the identification "Mommy" for Ken (by Roger) is simply false: Ken is quite simply not Roger's mother and that must be the end of the analysis. However, if we take a sequentialist position instead, the meaning of "Yes Mommy" becomes clearer.
A specific alternative to [the referentialist] possibility would be:
The The foregoing discussion does not of course tell us that [...] sequencing analysis precedes other things than reference analysis; it deals with the relative use of these sorts of analysis, in some instances of their mutual evidence.
That is, finding the referential relevance of the category "Mommy" (for Roger) cannot be completely distinct from its turn-sequential relevance in an INSULT -> RETURN-INSULT pair. This lends some (if not conclusive) support to the idea that Sacks never seriously thought of the analysis of "reference to persons" (that is, what would become membership categorisation analysis) as somehow separate from CA generally. Clearly, at least in this instance, reference to persons makes no sense without first inspecting sequencing considerations. And, as we have seen, Sacks appeared to want to generalise from the fragment in question; to find the more general social machinery that could have generated any such instance. Why is this "machinery" important?
The power of the machinery v
In several parts of Aspects, Sacks remarks on the "power of the machinery" and the relations between its orientational rules (such as "only one party talks at a time") and questions of "public law". Just after the middle of Chapter 2, for
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speakers' in situ interests) are hooked up with public rule mechanisms (in which, Sacks says, no one could be personally interested). He puts the problem this way (page 45):
How is it that matters are arranged so that people have an interest, concern, with some sorts of rules that in any particular case may be uninteresting for the particular scene, but which
[need] in some way to be generally operative; and which Note also that Sacks shows how emotions can be organised around such public rules (page 48).
What we get apparently, is that the general features are transformed into local private rights which are affiliated to anybody by virtue of the fact that they "just happen to be talking now". And emotions are apparently organized around those in very strong ways; so that e.g., in the case of interruption, people will become utterly outraged, livid, over the occurrence of an interruption, in a way that is presumably no weaker than the outrage they could feel about any other of their "private rights". Now that type of operation gains the The power of this analytic tool is potentially very extensive, and some of it made its way into the eventually published version in the turn-taking paper .... More work along these lines was planned; perhaps some day more will appear, however impoverished by Sacks' unavailability to press it ahead in his own distinctive way.
Taking up this never-completely formulated idea of "power": in the literature comparing Sacks with classical sociology (for example, Silverman, 1998, p. 59) , it is well known that Sacks eschews any classical sociological concept of "power".
There's just a possibility, however, that, in Aspects, Sacks is not eschewing but fundamentally reconstructing the classical conception of power in terms of the power of the "machinery". In Aspects, the machinery, that is, is characterised as both extensively and finely powerful. A possible inference is: for everyday life (and the machinery for its being done), what is "fine" is also "extensive" -and vice versa. It is "fine" in its locality and specificity; it does "just this" for "just these" local purposes and interests. It is "extensive", however, by virtue of any particular
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This would be the ultimate argument against the "so what?" (or "triviality of the data") question; and against the putative "micro-macro" distinction. The machinery that generates the supposedly "trivial" data (the minutiae of everyday conduct) is both extensively and finely powerful -where "the machinery" is what people have to know-and-use in order to know-and-use what they manifestly can be analytically proven to know-and-use in the conduct of their everyday affairs.
And then CA would be any rigorous attempt to uncover that machinery from the materials at hand.
Aspects of Aspects | 21 (Sacks, 1992b, pp. 222-268) as well as Lectures 1 and 2 from the Fall 1968 series (Sacks, 1992b, pp. 3-31) and the April 24 lecture from Spring 1968 (Sacks, 1992a, pp. 764-772) . There are no "Summer lectures from 1970" in the published edition of Sacks's Lectures.
ii . An interesting footnote on p. 15 of this chapter considers laughing, and prefigures later published papers (Sacks, 1974; 1978; Jefferson et al., 1987) . It reads:
Laughing is of particular interest not only for reasons mentioned earlier, that it is a thing for which timing is particularly relevant (cf GTS:2:16 which should be used for the delayed reaction point being made), but also because laughing is one quite special sort of thing in this way: It is a sort of sequentially relevant object that specifically does not have it that it should be done in a one at a time way as a feature of it. Not merely is it okay that it be done with more than one doing it at a time, but to have it done one at a time involves that for each it will not be seen that one waited until the other was finished laughing to start, but one's start will be seen as locating when it is that one caught the joke. One should laugh iv . On the first reading of this paper in Manchester, the "added value" question was put to me by Rod Watson with characteristic and continuing collegiality.
It has taken me several years of thinking to be able to reply to it. Even nowso excellent are Rod's questions -I'm not completely sure about the response. One does one's best! v . It should be noted that most of the analytic material from Aspects dealt with in this section is taken almost verbatim from the the second volume of the Lectures (or possibly vice versa). See in particular (Sacks, 1992b, pp. 50-51) .
What interests me most about this overlap of texts is that Sacks chose these particular connections to provide focal points, in his only proposedly published book. His contribution to the configuration of the social sciences generally was clearly important to him.
vi . The typescript has: "needs", "requires" and "it is". and, that it may not suffice can then turn out to be relevant for the sort of talk that participants then do, which means then that the insufficiency of the public law to have its intended features operative is relevant for keeping participants in some actual conversation doing the talk that not only mobilizes interests of other parties, but in then doing talk which will involve not merely that the other parties are silent during that talk but also will talk on its completion, and will do talk on its completion that will in turn get others to talk on their completion. Then the weakness of the public law is a resource for actual conversations.
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viii . In Chapter 2, for example, Sacks writes (pages 52-53):
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So we have really enormously elaborate, and apparently also powerful -if not over-powerful -sets of regulations that are operative about the classes for which "interrupting" is a case, fitted onto the private rights of any speaker to speak until completion, fitted onto the general feature "exactly one party talks at a time".
And of course, the same enforcement structure will be operative for a series of other features, fitted to other mechanisms or required parts of this general structure. When we ask -as we might reasonably ask -"Why in the world is such a big deal made of that somebody interrupts someone; why are there these enormous operative machines ready to engage in working on such a fact?"
what we have done is to mis-concretize the phenomenon. That is to say, we have asked "Why is it such a big deal about that somebody interrupted someone?" What we have is a mechanism designed to get at the general way of preserving whole classes of things, for anybody; where the preservation of "one party at a time" in conversation in general is of great import; that is to say, the communication system turns on it in many many ways. (My   emphasis) 
